Researcher's View: National Security Beyond the Battlefield: A Strategic Vision for Romania and Azerbaijan

Keywords: national security, energy, alliances, power, diplomacy, military, defense.

 

Abstract

 

National security expands far beyond the traditional military matters. It embraces the economic power, energy independence and diplomatic communication. Strategic security for medium and small powers, like Romania and Azerbaijan refers to finding a balance between alliances, energy resources and regional cooperation so that they can shield themselves against both internal vulnerabilities and external attacks. Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic States are examples of the weaponization of the energy dependence and why it is not beneficial to rely only on a single energy provider. Therefore, independence through smart power, an adaptive mix of hard and soft power is much needed. For Romania and Azerbaijan, national defense is less a matter of the use of force, it is more one of building durability, prevention and confidence through strategic international partnerships and energy diplomacy. Sooner or later, reshaping national security into an integrated, dynamic context is what Romania and Azerbaijan must have to do in order to face the challenges of this unpredictable global stage.

 

Introduction

 

National security is no longer contoured only by military force. It involves the protection of critical energy infrastructure, economic durability against external pressures and a country’s competence to negotiate effectively in the nowadays problematic international environments. This is especially true for medium and smaller states like Romania and Azerbaijan, where energy, diplomacy, and security reinforce one another and become the foundation for creating a long-term development and for preventing vulnerabilities that larger powers might exploit.

The term of national security, as it is presented today, was suggested for the first time during the 17th  century, when it became clear that every state needs a right to manage its internal affairs, as a result of the Thirty Years War in Europe and the English Civil War, as described by Kim R. Holmes [1] in his paper. These events, together with the Peace of Westphalia, formed the concept of the nation-state: a new way of seeing the concept of independence, for which the states took full responsibility regarding the domestic affairs and foreign protection.

It became a routine job. It was no longer just a question of defending frontiers. One of the earliest examples of this change was the Congress of Vienna, which is described as „the return to a classical order for fifty-five years after the troubles of the revolutionary period in Europe” [2]. 

Even though its original purpose was the reclaiming of territorial balance, the extensive factor was a new diplomatic system: the Concert of Europe, the primary concern of which was dialogue and coordination among nations in attempt to prevent further war. This trend did not refer for peace alone: it institutionalized security, proving that persistent diplomacy can be an effective tool in protecting national interests without engaging in war, as explained by Kyle Lascurettes [3] in his publication.

 

Defining National Security in The Actual Geopolitical Context

 

Today, national security is an evolving response to the ongoing global events. What was once mainly presented in terms of armed forces and borders, currently it is built on important sections, such as economic resilience, energy systems, technological innovation and information integrity. Now, in 2025, this transformation is more visible than ever. So, in a way, the older idea of national security being strictly represented by military force, caught a new multi-faceted meaning: one that blends power with partnerships and policy. Also, for the smaller nations that navigate this world characterized by competition between the larger powers, this intensive, advanced understanding is not an option: it is essential. 

This new definition of national security captures how interdependent our globalized world has become. It is not sufficient anymore for a nation to focus only on borders or troops: what happens in the economy, energy or even climate policy can have immediate consequences for a country’s capacity to stay safe and self-sustaining. For countries like Azerbaijan and Romania, which are not global superpowers but hold strategic value due to their geographic positions and energy roles, this shift is even more important. They rely heavily on strategic energy partnerships and economic diplomacy. Safety to them does not resume only to the protection of borders anymore. It is about making sure that energy flows are stable, the trade routes are open, and outside pressures don't leave them in a vulnerable position. Without economic and energy security, even a well-defended, strong nation can fail, because financial insecurity and lack of resources can create internal weaknesses that others can exploit. So, being part of international energy projects or trade networks, for example, isn’t just good for growth: it can also act as a buffer against political pressure or regional instability.

According to Barry Buzan [4], national insecurity is not just the existence of physical danger, but also the perception of vulnerability, especially for the states with internal weaknesses. A state like Romania, even though an EU and NATO ally, can experience insecurity anytime, due to its geographical surroundings to conflict zones, like the Black Sea or Ukraine, but also because of its partial dependence on energy imports. Similarly, Azerbaijan, rich in resources, still faces vulnerability from threats caused by territorial conflicts, regional powers’ competition and the need to keep transit routes stable and free from any external influence.

Buzan also warns that threats tend to be politically constructed, meaning that the decision-makers can emphasize or downplay risks in order to serve the internal or external agendas. This makes strategic energy diplomacy even more important: countries like Romania and Azerbaijan must make sure not only that they secure physical access to energy, but also that they build trust and regional alliances that work against the perception of weakness. Otherwise, as the international relations scholar explains, insecurity can be born not only from external aggression, but also from internal issues which attract the foreign influence. For example, the war in Ukraine, now in its third year, and the resulting energy crisis across Europe have forced countries to rethink not just where their energy comes from, but how that energy shapes their political independence. By diversifying gas imports, countries like Romania have become more involved in regional energy security initiatives, supplying electricity and gas to Moldova and Ukraine, as the source [5] has shown. All of these illustrate how national security today requires energy reliability and economic capacity to adapt in times of crisis.

At the same time, we see countries creating new types of alliances. In January 2025, Iran and Russia joined a big strategic partnership [6], with the purpose of resisting Western sanctions through stronger economic coordination. While this is a classic case of economic diplomacy being used in geopolitical balancing, it is also a reminder for smaller nations like Romania and Azerbaijan that they should actively invest in their own circle of cooperation to avoid being left behind or manipulated in the games of the big powers. The risks of inaction are not unrealistic, because history offers real examples: Belarus, at the beginning of 2000s, was reliant on Russia for „over 90% of its oil and gas imports” [7]. This so-called „brotherly alliance” [8], turned upside down as soon as Moscow began using energy deliveries as a tool for political influence: „in 2004, Russia’s state-owned company Gazprom temporarily cut gas supplies during price renegotiations” [9], pressuring Belarus to accept higher tariffs and an increased economic integration. The situation escalated in 2007, when „Russia briefly shut down the Druzhba oil pipeline”[10], accusing Belarus of siphoning oil without authorization, an action that disrupted energy flows not only to Belarus, but to parts of Poland and Germany as well.

The consequences of these events revealed the strategic cost of energy dependency. Belarus was forced to privatize parts of its gas transit infrastructure, giving away „partial control of its energy sector to Gazprom in exchange for price discounts” [11]. So, this led to little room for tactics: Belarus's attempts to balance between East and West were increasingly inhibited, resulting in closer economic and security ties with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union.
As Margarita Balmaceda explains, these events showed how energy was no longer just a market good, but „a tool of conditionality” [12] with Moscow offering „favorable terms only in exchange for political loyalty” [13]. So, Belarus's energy disputes were never purely economic, but part of a bigger strategy to reintegrate the country into Russia’s geopolitical path. The case of Belarus serves as a powerful reminder for countries like Romania and Azerbaijan of what is at stake. Energy dependence can be used as an influencing instrument, turning economic interdependence into political submission. 

Belarus is far from the only case where smaller or mid-sized nations have been caught in the crossfire of energy-based political pressure. Lithuania offers another important example: in 2006, after selling its main refinery to a Polish firm rather than a Russian one, „Russia shut down the Druzhba pipeline branch supplying Lithuanian crude oil” [14]. Though pictured as a technical issue, the closure was never reversed, suggesting a form of long-term correctional authority. Similarly, studies [15] show that Ukraine suffered multiple gas disruptions in 2006 and 2009, after pricing disputes with Gazprom, which ultimately affected not only Ukrainian consumers, but also states like Romania, Italy, and Germany. These episodes show how bilateral energy tensions can quickly escalate into regional instability.

In Georgia and Armenia, sudden „pipeline explosions in 2006 led to severe gas shortages” [16]. Although Russia attributed the accidents to rebellions, Georgian authorities saw it as a form of political correction: „we don't think it was accidental in any way” [17], said the Georgian president at the time, Mikhail Saakashvili. The same year, „Estonia and Latvia experienced reduced energy exports and trade blockages” [18], following political moves classified as anti-Russian, such as „Estonia’s decision to relocate a Soviet war memorial” [19]. These orchestrated energy and trade disruptions illustrate warnings that dependency on a single supplier, even in the absence of direct conflict, can expose a country to strategic blackmail.

Together, all these examples picture clear pattern: energy dependence becomes political vulnerability, especially when supplier states are willing to destroy the infrastructure and market access to discipline their neighbors. Romania and Azerbaijan, however, have agreed not to end up in that kind of situation through diversification and active diplomacy, although such task has to be constantly renewed to keep up with the always-changing geopolitical landscape.

 

Is National Security Really That Ambiguous?

 

To understand the strategic vulnerabilities outlined in the previous examples, such as Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltic States, it is necessary to understand what national security truly requires in today’s global context. National security is no longer a narrow concept reserved for military operations or territorial defense, as B. Buzan used to argue in his paper: „that section of academia which is most concerned with security is largely locked into a narrow view of it” [20]. Could this narrow point of view determine the nature of national security as ambiguous? Could national security really be such a cryptic term that, in the end, it lacks a proper definition? Or is it just a complex term that takes a lot of analysis of its multidimensional spheres, which form the definition of it?

According to the fundamental notions of national security, Arnold Wolfers' essay [21], considers that the term "national security" is basically ambiguous, a symbol that can mean different things to different people. He states: „national security or national interest... may not mean the same thing to different people. They may not have any precise meaning at all” [22].

This ambiguity comes from the fact that the term has both objective and subjective elements. Objectively, it refers to the absence of threats to a nation's core values. Subjectively, it implies that the absence of fear will have such values attacked. This two-sided nature means that what precisely is a threat, or the perception of one, can differ significantly between nations, or even within the same nation over time. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, in his article “National Security Is Still an Ambiguous Concept” [23], reinforces Wolfers' viewpoint by affirming that the ambiguity of national security is still present in the contemporary debates. He explains that he had numerous attempts to define and operationalize the term, but it still remains a fluid concept, usually defined by the political and strategic contexts. Da Cruz states: „despite the many documents released acknowledging a nation’s national security, the concept is still as ambiguous today as it was in 1952” [24].

This ongoing ambiguity allows for multiple interpretations, which can be both a strength and a weakness. On one hand, it provides space for states to adapt their security strategies to evolving threats. On the other hand, it can lead to inconsistencies and contradictions in policy implementation. But the main question of this subchapter remains: Is national security truly so ambiguous that it lacks definition? Is it such a fluid and subjective concept that we cannot identify clear, dimensional spheres that make up its core? 

While I recognize the validity of the ambiguity pointed out by scholars like Wolfers and da Cruz, I believe that national security can and should be defined, particularly when examined through a multidimensional lens. 

 

Components of National Security

 

While national security has been referred to as an ambiguous concept, the structured suggestions made by scholars like Holmes and Buzan show that it can be clearly defined and operationalized. Recognizing its multidimensional nature makes it easy for the policymakers to think about strategies that address the complex challenges of the modern states.
In his essay, Kim R. Holmes [25] explains that in order to understand various definitions of national security, one should record some of the concepts that the term includes, like power, military strength, force and national defense.

Fig. 1. Components of National Security

Power in national security is defined as „a state's capacity to control its sovereignty and destiny” [26]. This requires self-protection from external threats and imposing influence to shape its strategic environment. Holmes places power on a compass with hard power (military, intelligence, law enforcement) on one end, and soft power (diplomacy, development assistance, public influence) on the other. But in a rapidly, constantly changing world, this distribution does not function as a simple left-to-right line, but rather as a web: fluid, interconnected, and adaptive.

Modern global threats, like cyberwar, misinformation, energy blackmail and economic constraint cannot be prevented or fixed using hard power alone. Power today is less about control and more about adaptability. For example, Romania and Azerbaijan, neither military superpower, use energy diplomacy and regional cooperation to increase their geopolitical influence. Their power lies not in domination, but in strategic connectivity. This means that the nature of power has evolved, and it is not enough to visualize power through two opposite poles. To this challenge, Joseph Nye, explains how „in learning to deal with the problems, many of them unprecedented, raised by power diffusion we will need a much better account of what power is” [27].

Recognizing the limits of the exercise of hard or soft power individually, Joseph Nye introduces the notion of smart power, the strategic combination of both. He defines power as „the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants” [28]. He also elaborates that it is possible to do this through three primary methods: coercion (through threats or force to influence others), payments (offering motivations or rewards) and soft power (shaping preferences through reconsideration and legitimacy). According to him, in the modern era, the ability to mix these methods in an effective way is crucial for any actor of international politics, because „to deal with a government and with a civil society requires an extraordinary ability to use both hard and soft power” [29]. A good example is the United States, which, despite being a global superpower, has come to admit that military strength alone is no longer sufficient to secure its global leadership. Joseph S. Nye takes it further to explain that “the military alone cannot defend America’s interests around the world” [30] and that a combination of both coercion and attraction is the most suitable method for modern politics. This case provides an additional valuable lesson for smaller but strategically positioned countries like Romania and Azerbaijan. Although they may not possess extensive hard power capabilities, they can still enhance their security and influence by investing in diplomacy, international partnerships, and cultural participation, which are the most important components of soft power that strengthen resilience and promote stability in the international system. 

Rather than trying to match the power of great powers, these states can focus on using their strategic position and targeted partnerships to maximize their net power and, thereby, their national security.

The next concept of national security, according to Kim R. Holmes is force. He defines force as „the use of a military or law enforcement capacity to achieve some objective” [31], making a crucial distinction between force, as an applied tool, and power, as a bigger concept of possibilities. So, force is not synonymous with power, but rather an active expression of it. This means that if the force is used in a wrong way, whether through failed interventions or disproportionate actions, the state’s credibility and strategic influence can be damaged. This view is pictured by Barry Buzan [32], who warns that security based too heavily on military force creates what he calls a security dilemma, where states unintentionally provoke threats by appearing aggressive.
For Romania and Azerbaijan, countries navigating between larger power blocs, this principle is significant. Their security does not rely on huge military capability, but on maintaining credible defensive and cooperating positions, while carefully choosing when and how to apply pressing instruments. Romania, as a NATO member, benefits from collective defense while avoiding individual use of force. Instead, it contributes peacekeeping troops and focuses on strategic defense in the Black Sea region. Azerbaijan, following its military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, has had to adjust its use of force within larger structures of regional diplomacy, especially in its relations with Turkey, Russia and the EU. 

As the military theorist, Colin Gray observes in his work [33] that effective military strategy requires the careful integration of force within the policy framework, avoiding inconsistent or unequal use. This supports the idea that in national security, force must be fixed in a wider strategy, one that balances pressure with diplomacy, resilience and alliances. His statement reinforces the idea that military power should always be subordinate to clearly defined political objectives, serving to achieve them. For both Romania and Azerbaijan, wisely managing the use of force especially in tensed regions, becomes not only a matter of effectiveness, but of survival. National security, in their cases, depends not just on having force, but on knowing precisely when not to use it.
When analyzing national security from a strategic planning perspective, it becomes essential to differentiate military strength from national defense, even though the two concepts are often used as identical in political discourse. While both serve as pillars of state power, they reflect different functions and implications within a nation’s security structure. 

Military strength, as explained by Kim R. Holmes, is fundamentally a „static measure of the power of a country” [34] and „a variable that is subject to all sorts of factors, including the relative strength of opponents, the degree to which it is used effectively, or whether it is even used at all” [35]. He continues that this strength must be meaningfully organized and applied through what he calls national defense: „the ability of the armed forces to defend the sovereignty of the nation and the lives of its people” [36]. 

Holmes’s perspective resonates with Hans Morgenthau’s realist framework, which treats military capability as a critical, yet limited dimension of state power. As Morgenthau argues, „military strength is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of national power” [37], highlighting that armed force remains essential for national survival, but it risks destabilizing outcomes when is separated from well-organized strategy or diplomatic engagement. His critique of „the crusading spirit of a political ideology” [38] warns against confusing military influence with political effectiveness, promoting instead for a measured application, aligned with national objectives and integrated into an extended diplomatic strategy. This corresponds with his suggestion that „power divorced from morality is the root of evil in politics” [39], highlighting how unchecked power leads to excessive ambition.

The difference between military strength and national defense is not simply just semantic, but also operational. Military strength represents the possible capacity for intimidation that is measured in troops, weapons and budgets, while national defense reflects the actualized system that approaches this potential into sustainable security. As Eliot Cohen clarifies in his work: „military power is like an engine: its raw horsepower matters less than how it is engineered into a vehicle, maintained, and driven” [40]. 

This distinction becomes particularly crucial for states like Romania and Azerbaijan that must optimize limited resources. As Hew Strachan observes: „the test of military strength lies not in parades or budgets, but in how defense institutions translate it into political influence and lasting security” [41]. Therefore, military strength represents the foundation, the brute force, even though Stephen Biddle warns in his work that „superior numbers guarantee nothing if misapplied” [42]. A good example for this could be Russia’s military strength in Ukraine that „faltered due to flawed logistics and morale” [43]. 

Fig. 3. Military strength and national defense as Pillars of National Security

 

Therefore, national defense becomes the operating system that transforms potential into strength through doctrine, alliances and logistics, as it can be observed in the figure above. The doctrine is described by Colin Gray in „Strategy Bridge” [44] as the glue between policy and action. For instance, take a look a Romania’s NATO-aligned defense doctrine [45] that integrates collective deterrence with Black Sea regional cooperation. Regarding the alliances, dr. Rebecca Lissner makes an important note: „alliances amplify strength but demand strategic patience” [46]. This can be observed through Azerbaijan’s balancing act between Turkey, that stands as a strong military partner, and the European Union, as the economic partner.

 
It is safe to say that military strength and national defense are part of a feedback loop, because effective national defense improves the military strength over time. Investments in cyber defense, for example, can now directly improve the military power, as J. Nye [47] explains in his work. But, as Snyder [48] explains in his book, exaggerating on military expansion at the expense of defense infrastructure can cause fragile security.

 

References:

 

1.    Kim R. Holmes, „What is National Security” in „Index of US Military Strength”, The Heritage Foundation, 2015.
2.    Major Alexandre Thellier, French Army, „ The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815: How Negotiators’ Political Culture Enabled a True.", 2018.
3.    Kyle Lascurettes, „The Concert of Europe and Great-Power Governance Today – What Can the Order of the 19th - Century Europe Teach Policymakers About International Order in the 21st Century?”, Perspective and RAND Corporation, 2017, p. 5.
4.    Barry Buzan, „People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War, Era”, Second Edition, Department of International Studies, University of Warwick, First published in Great Britain in 1983, WHEATSHEAF BOOKS LTD, ISB 0-7108-0101-7 ISBN 0-7108-0106-8, 1983, pp. 39–42.
5.    Nicoleta Bănilă for SeeNews, „Romania to ensure gas supply to Ukraine, Moldova through Greece-Bulgaria pipeline PM”, 2022, https://seenews.com/news/romania-to-ensure-gas-supply-to-ukraine-moldova-through-greece-bulgaria-pipeline-pm-1212547 , last accessed on the 5th of April 2025.
6.    Vladimir Isachenkov for Associated Press, „ Russia and Iran sign a partnership treaty to deepen their ties in the face of Western sanctions”, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-iran-pezeshkian-treaty-partnership-71a20990373851741d1fe76a81699036 , last accessed on the 5th of April 2025.
7.    Szymon Kardaś, Kamil Kłysiński for OSW - Centre for Eastern Studies, „The story that never ends. A new stage in the energy dispute between Russia and Belarus”, 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2017-05-17/story-never-ends-a-new-stage-energy-dispute-between-russia-and , last accessed on the 5th of April 2025.
8.     Vladai Papers for the Journal Russia in Global Affairs, „Belarus-Russia: Is It a Real Brotherhood?”, 2020, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/belarus-russia-brotherhood/ , last accessed on the 5th of April 2025.
9.    Wojciech Konończuk, „Belarusian-Russian Energy Conflict: The Game Is Not Over” in Fundacja Batorego Stefan Batory Foundation, „Więcej niż sąsiedztwo - More than Neighbours”, Analiza Policy Brief, Warsaw, January, 2007, p. 3.
10.    Reuters, „FACTBOX: Russian oil and gas export interruptions”, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us/factbox-russian-oil-and-gas-export-interruptions-idUSLS578972/ , last accessed on the 5th of April 2025.
11.    News Wires for France 24, „Russia secures ownership of Belarus gas pipelines”, 2011, https://www.france24.com/en/20111125-russias-gas-deal-power-putin-belarus-pipeline-ukraine-lukashenko-moscow , last accessed on the 5th of April 2025.
12.    Margarita M. Balmaceda, „ Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania Between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure”, University of Toronto Press, 2013, p. 15.
13.    Ibidem, p. 21.
14.    Vladimir Socor for JamesTown Foundation, „Russia Oil Supplies to Lithuania Cut Off” in Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 3, Issue 150, 2006, https://jamestown.org/program/russian-oil-supplies-to-lithuania-cut-off/ , last accessed on the 5th of April 2025.
15.    Sijbnem de Jong, Jan Wouters and Steven Sterkx, „The 2009 Russian-Ukrainian Gas Dispute: Lessons for European Energy Crisis Management after Lisbon” in European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 15, , 2010, Kluwer Law International BV, pp. 511–538.
16.    C.J. Chivers for New York Times, „ Explosions in Russia Cut Gas Pipelines to Georgia”, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/22/international/europe/explosions-in-russia-cut-gas-pipelines-to-georgia.html , last accessed on the 5th of April 2025.
17.    Idem.
18.    Reuters, „FACTBOX: Russian oil and gas export interruptions”, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us/factbox-russian-oil-and-gas-export-interruptions-idUSLS578972/ , last accesed on the 5th of April 2025.
19.    Camille Gijs for Politico, „ Estonia removes Soviet Union war monuments”, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/estonia-removes-soviet-union-war-monuments/ , last accessed on the 5th of April 2025.
20.    Buzan Barry, „People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, p. 5.
21.    Arnold Wolfers, „ “National Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol” in Political Science Quaterly by The Journal of Public and International Affairs, Vol. 67, Issue 4, Academy of Political Science, 1952, pp. 481—502.
22.    Ibidem, p. 481.
23.    José de Arimatéia da Cruz, „National Security Is Still an Ambiguous Concept” in Journal of Advanced Military Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, Project MUSE, 2021, pp. 210–215. 
24.    Idem.
25.    Kim R. Holmes, „What is National Security”, pp. 17–18.
26.    Ibidem, p. 18.
27.    Joseph S. Nye, Jack Landman Goldsmith, „The Future of Power” in Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 64, No. 3, 2011, p. 46.
28.    Idem.
29.    Ibidem, p. 47.
30.    Joseph S. Nye Jr., „Soft power and Smart power” in „The instruments and Institutions of American Purpose”, Foreword by Joseph S. Nye and Brent Scowcroft, edited by Kurt M. Campbell and Jonathon Pricce, 2009, The Aspen Institute, p. 31.
31.    Kim R. Holmes, Idem, p. 18.
32.    Barry Buzan, „People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, pp. 156–207. 
33.     Colin S. Grey, „Modern Strategy”, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 1–17.
34.    Kim R. Holmes, Idem.
35.    Idem.
36.    Idem.
37.    Morgenthau Hans J, „Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace” ,7th Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005, p. 140.
38.    Ibidem, p. 11.
39.    Ibidem, p. 165.
40.    Eliot Cohen, „The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force”, New York: Basic Books, 2018, p. 29.
41.    Strachan Hew, „The direction of war: contemporary strategy in historical perspective”, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 47.
42.    Stephen Biddle, „Military power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle”, Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 17.
43.    Biddle Stephen, Jeffrey Friedman, „How the War in Ukraine Might End”, Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022, p. 112.
44.    Gray, Colin S, „The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 40–46.
45.    Presidential Administration, 2020, „National Defense Strategy of the Country for the Period 2020 2024”, Bucharest, https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente/Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_2020_2024.pdf , ,last accessed on the 5th of April, 2025, pp. 8–17.
46.    Rebecca Lissner, Mira Rapp-Hooper, „An open World: How America Can Win the Contest for Twenty-First-Century Order”, Yale University Press, 2020, p. 
47.    Joseph S. Nye Jr., „Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace” in „International Security”, Volume 41, Issue 3, Winter 2016/2017, p. 56.
48.    Snyder Jack, „Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition”, Cornell University Press, 1991, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt32b48h , last accessed on the 10th of March 2025.  

 

Dinulescu Alexandra-Ștefania
Ph.D. student at Baku State University,
Faculty of International Relations and Economy
E-mail: alexandrastefaniaag7@gmail.com
ORCID NO: 0009-0005-4226-3815 

Xülasə

Milli təhlükəsizlik ənənəvi hərbi məsələlərdən qat-qat geniş bir anlayışdır. O, iqtisadi güc, enerji müstəqilliyi və diplomatik əlaqələri də əhatə edir. Rumıniya və Azərbaycan kimi orta və kiçik dövlətlər üçün strateji təhlükəsizlik ittifaqlar, enerji resursları və regional əməkdaşlıq arasında balans tapmaqdan ibarətdir ki, bu da həm daxili zəifliklərdən, həm də xarici təhdidlərdən qorunmağa imkan verir. Belarus, Ukrayna və Baltikyanı ölkələr enerji asılılığının təzyiq vasitəsi kimi necə istifadə oluna biləcəyinin və enerji təchizatında tək mənbədən asılılığın hansı riskləri daşıdığının nümunələridir. Bu baxımdan, sərt və yumşaq gücün uyğunlaşdırılmış kombinasiyası olan "ağıllı güc" konsepsiyasına əsaslanan müstəqillik xüsusilə vacibdir. Rumıniya və Azərbaycan üçün milli müdafiə daha az dərəcədə güc tətbiqi ilə, daha çox isə davamlılığın gücləndirilməsi, qabaqlayıcı tədbirlərin görülməsi və strateji beynəlxalq tərəfdaşlıqlar və enerji diplomatiyası vasitəsilə etimadın artırılması ilə bağlıdır. Tez və ya gec, milli təhlükəsizliyin inteqrasiya olunmuş və dinamik bir sistemə çevrilməsi Rumıniya və Azərbaycan üçün qeyri-sabit və proqnozlaşdırılması çətin olan qlobal dünyanın çağırışlarına cavab verə bilmələri baxımından zəruri addımdır. 
Açar sözlər: milli təhlükəsizlik, energetika, ittifaqlar, güc, diplomatiya, silahlı qüvvələr, müdafiə.