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"PUBLIC ATTITUDE TO THE RESULTS OF THE PATRIOTIC WAR" ANALYTICAL REPORT



SOCIAL
RESEARCH
CENTER



About the Social Research Center

The Social Research Center (SRC) was established by Presidential Decree No. 525 on February 8, 2019, in the Republic of Azerbaijan. As a public legal entity, the SRC systematically analyzes the evolving dynamics of social relations. It identifies current trends, predicts changes, and investigates their potential impact on society. Utilizing state-of-the-art information technologies and scientific methodologies, the SRC conducts social research and studies public opinion. Its findings are presented to government authorities to inform policy-making and decision-making processes.

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of The Patriotic War”**

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OVERVIEW OF SURVEY RESULTS

I. The results of the Patriotic War in public opinion

○ The main expectation of society (90.6%) from the Patriotic War, which started on September 27, was the complete liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the 7 adjacent regions from occupation.

○ Almost one in three people (30.7%) believed that the war would end sooner, and 7.8% believed that it would end later. Only 6.0% of respondents expected either only the surrounding 7 districts or only Nagorno-Karabakh to be completely freed from occupation.

○ Only 2.5% of respondents expected international peacekeepers to come to the region.

○ The Patriotic War ended as expected by 88.4% of the population. Among those who said that the Patriotic War ended as they expected, those from the middle (36-45 years) and older (56-65 years) age groups prevailed compared to those from other age groups.

○ For 11.6% of respondents, the Patriotic War did not end as expected. Two main factors stand out as the reasons for this - the failure to remove Armenians from all occupied lands (67.7%) and the entry of Russian peacekeepers into the region (44.6%).

○ The reason for dissatisfaction of about one third of the sample (29.2%) is that the connection between Karabakh and Armenia through the Lachin Corridor is not fully under the control of Azerbaijan.

○ In the eyes of the population, the greatest positive effect of the Second Karabakh war for our country was the further increase in trust in the Commander-in-Chief (90.0%) and the national army, as well as the strengthening of national unity (75.5%).

○ Half of the population holds the opinion that the Patriotic War replaced the “defeat syndrome” that arose in the 1990s with the feeling of a “victorious nation”. Additionally, 27.0% of the respondents chose the option “There were no major issues in socio-economic security”.

II. Level of awareness and attitude towards the statement signed on November 10

○ 81.0% of the population stated that they are aware of the statement signed by Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia on November 10, with 42.5% indicating they are “fully aware” and 38.5% indicating they are “partially aware”. Additionally, 19.1% of the respondents reported having no information about the joint statement.

○ The option “I have no information” was selected relatively more by those with general secondary education (40.0%) and those with complete secondary education (26.8%).

○ An interesting finding reveals a statistically significant correlation between the level of awareness of the statement signed by Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia on November 10 and the attitude towards the statement. Specifically, the higher the level of awareness, the more likely the attitude towards the statement is positive. For instance, 92.0% of the population who reported being fully aware of the statement viewed it favorably, whereas the corresponding figure was approximately 20.0% lower for those who had no information. This underscores the importance of educating the public about the statement through trusted individuals and institutions.

○ 86.0% of respondents are clear about the statement signed by Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia on November 10.

○ Regarding the statement signed by Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia on November 10, about 14.0% of respondents remain unclear. Among the respondents, 20.0% who mainly received information from social networks said that there were still unclear points for them. This indicator is 12.8% among those who mainly receive information from television.

○ For a part of the population (14.0%) regarding the statement, these three points are mostly unclear: the lack of a clear statement about the status of the three regions - Khan-

kendi, Khojaly and Khojavend (41.0%), the failure to specify the mechanisms for regulating the coexistence of Azerbaijanis and Armenians (26.0%) and Russia future activities of peacekeepers (24.0%).

- 75.0% of the respondents said that the comments given in the mass media about the statement were completely clear, while 7.0% said that they were not clear. Additionally, 15.0% said that conflicting opinions were voiced.

- 85.9% of the population expressed a positive attitude to the joint statement signed by Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia in varying degrees (54.2% “completely positive”, 31.7% “mostly positive”).

- The indicator for those who expressed their negative attitude to the tripartite statement to some degree is only 7.2%. Similarly, 7.0% of respondents find it difficult to express their opinion about it.

- Only 56.4% (340 people) of the respondents expressed their opinion about the item they liked or disliked in the joint statement. The fact that 43.6% of the respondents could not express any opinion about it indicates that they may not be aware of the statement.

- 56.6% of the respondents who stated that there are still unclear points about the statement noted the negative aspects of the statement. Conversely, 23.5% of the respondents who stated that all points are clear mentioned the negative aspects.

- 40.6% of the respondents favored the 6th point (44.9%), which addresses the withdrawal of Armenia’s troops from Aghdam, Kalbajar, and Lachin regions, as well as the 9th point, which outlines the restoration of all economic and transport links in the region and the liberation of Nakhchivan from the blockade. 31.0% of respondents preferred another item. Overall, the historical victory achieved by Azerbaijan is measured not only by military successes but also by contributions to the foundation of the state.

- 28.0% of respondents identified the 3rd point (40.8%) concerning the deployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent along the contact line in Karabakh and along the Lachin corridor as the two points they disliked

the most. Similarly, the 4th point, which entails the deployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in parallel with the withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces, was noted by 43.2% of respondents.

As a result of analyzing the opinions on the 3rd and 4th points of the statement, it can be concluded that the points mentioned advocate for the complete withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from Karabakh, as well as the peaceful evacuation of Armenians from Kalbajar, Aghdam, and Lachin, aligning with the peaceful return of our internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to the territory of Karabakh. However, the absence of Turkish peacekeepers in the military contingent raises concerns about reverting to the past traditional stance regarding territorial claims against Azerbaijan.

III. Socio-political expression of the joint statement

- According to a significant portion of the respondents (60.7%), the joint statement signed by Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia reflects the diplomatic skills of the President of Azerbaijan. For comparison, in the “Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict before and after the Homeland War” survey conducted by the Center for Social Research from August 24 to September 9, 2020, 93.1% of respondents believed that only the current country’s leadership could resolve the Karabakh issue militarily. Thus, it can be concluded that public expectations have aligned with the reality given the current situation.

- More than half of the population (51.6%) suggested that the Commander-in-Chief protects the interests of the people with the said document.

- 21.2% of respondents view the peace agreement as a political manifestation of our military victory. Additionally, 16.9% of respondents noted that this also signifies the decisive role of the army in the international arena.

- As for the effects of the corridor with Nakhchivan on the socio-economic development of Azerbaijan, 69.0% of the population

said that due to the connection with Nakhchivan, the prices of travel and cargo transportation between Azerbaijan and Turkey will decrease, as well as 63.7 % of the traffic and cargo circulation between Azerbaijan and Turkey will increase.

IV. Ensuring peace in the region

○ More than half of the population (54.7%) believe that peace in the region can be ensured by both Russian and Turkish peacekeepers.

○ 29.0% of the respondents who see only Turkish peacekeepers as the guarantors of peace in the region.

○ Only 4.5% of respondents said that this mission will be provided by international peacekeepers.

○ Only 1.0% of respondents expressed the belief that peace in the region will be ensured solely by Russian peacekeepers.

○ 35.5% of respondents believe that the arrival of Russian peacekeepers in the region will yield positive results. The primary rationale cited by 66.8% of respondents is the belief that this will deter Armenians from provoking Azerbaijanis. Additionally, 43.2% of respondents expressed confidence that the terms of the signed agreement will be upheld.

○ 44.6% of respondents believe that the arrival of Russian peacekeepers in the region will have negative consequences. A majority of these respondents (84.7%) express concern that Russian peacekeepers will prioritize the interests of Armenians. The second concern revolves around the potential establishment of a military base in Karabakh with the arrival of Russian peacekeepers, cited by 42.9% of respondents.

○ The noteworthy point is that 19.9% of the respondents found it difficult to express their opinion on this matter.

○ 57.0% of the population thinks that the illegal (anti-constitutional) activities of Armenians will be prevented by the presence of Turkish peacekeepers at the posts in the region together with Russian peacekeepers.

○ 49.6% of the respondents believe that the terms of the signed agreement will be fulfilled.

○ About the same number of respondents (47.3%) perceive the presence of the Turkish military contingent among the peacekeepers as a guarantee of stable and long-term peace in the region.

○ 33.8% noted that this will strengthen the position and contribute to the restoration of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity at the diplomatic stage.

V. The attitude toward the coexistence of Azerbaijanis and Armenians and the resumption of war.

○ A significant portion of the population (66.2%) believes that the coexistence of Azerbaijanis and Armenians in the administrative territories of Karabakh will never be possible, while 19.4% think it might be possible after a few years. Only 4.8% of respondents believe that such coexistence is possible in the near future.

○ Compared to men (58.0%), women (74.4%) stated that the coexistence of Azerbaijanis and Armenians will never be possible. Conversely, men (25.5%) think that cohabitation will be possible after a few years, unlike women (13.3%).

○ Young people who say that it will not be possible to live together with Armenians have an advantage compared to respondents from other age groups.

○ More than 80.0% of the population of Sheki-Zagatala and Upper Karabakh expressed a position against coexistence. A significant part of the residents of Absheron share the same opinion (73.7%).

○ The impossibility of cohabitation is shared by 75.0% of those with general secondary education, 71.7% of vocational-specialization/college graduates, 69.0% of those with full secondary education, and 57.7% of those with higher education.

○ Please note that in the "Great Return to Karabakh" survey conducted by the Social Research Center on October 9-13, 2020, 72.0% of IDP respondents thought that coexistence with the Armenian population in Karabakh, like other ethnic minorities, is im-

possible. Only 14.0% believed that this would be possible only after a long time. In the said survey, 90.3% of respondents said that they personally would not live with Armenians in those lands in the future, and about 8% of respondents said that they could.

○ Although a larger part of the society (66.0%) does not think that the military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan will flare up again, it is concerning that 28.6% of the respondents think the opposite. In other words, this result indicates that a certain part of the population (28.6%) believes that the conflict has not ended completely.

○ Among young people, those who believe that the military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan will flare up again are predominant compared to other age groups. Specifically, 37.3% of young respondents hold this belief.

VI. Information policy and information sources during the Patriotic War

○ A significant portion of the population believes that during the Patriotic War, the interviews of the President of the country with foreign mass media played a decisive role in our victory in the information war (80.0%).

○ In addition to the foreign audience, the President's regular communication with the people was the second most positively characterized aspect of the information policy (67.3%).

○ A certain part of the population positively evaluated the information activity carried out by Azerbaijanis worldwide to convey Armenian provocations to the global community (23.1%).

○ Only 7.2% of respondents believe that we cannot be successful in the information war.

○ As before the war, during the 44-day conflict, television remains the primary source of information for the population (90.4%). Among the respondents who relied on television channels for information, 62.6% mentioned AZTV, 60.2% mentioned ATV, 59.8% mentioned Khazar TV, and 42.2% mentioned Real TV as their main sources during the conflict. These findings are specific to the wartime

period and may not reflect the overall viewership ratings of TV channels. The viewership statistics and ratings of television channels may vary across different time periods.

○ As sources of information, the President's social media account (21.0%), conversations with people in their surroundings (12.3%), and social media platforms (12.0%) were the next most cited sources.

○ The majority (79.0%) of those who follow the activities of the President of the country on social networks preferred the Twitter platform. 13.9% of respondents followed the President's activities on Instagram, and 11.1% on Facebook.

○ Among social networks, Instagram (52.4%) and Facebook (42.9%) are the platforms that users turn to for information the most.

○ The worrying aspect is that a very small number of people turned to the websites of relevant institutions (1.5%) and social network pages (1.2%) to get information.

○ Only 4.2% of the population used Internet TV as the main source of information during the 44-day war, among which Kanal 13 (44.0%), Meydan TV (28.0%), and Baku TV (20.0%) stand out. The low viewing figures for Internet TV and websites can be attributed to the restrictions applied to Internet resources.

○ One out of every five respondents involved in the survey (20.7%) had a direct family member (excluding relatives) on the front lines or in the rear during the Patriotic War.

INTRODUCTION

During the pandemic, Armenia, the aggressor, ignored the initiative of the UN Secretary-General regarding the global ceasefire, which Azerbaijan strongly supported. Armenia intensified its military provocations and unacceptable harsh rhetoric against our country, making war inevitable. On September 27, Azerbaijan, in response to Armenia's provocations, launched counter-offensive operations. The 44-day Patriotic War resulted in the liberation of nearly 300 villages, 5 cities, 4 settlements, and numerous strategic heights in Azerbaijan, while a significant amount of enemy military equipment and personnel were destroyed.

The liberation of Shusha, the "beating heart of Karabakh," on November 8, definitively ensured our strategic advantage. Following this, Azerbaijan achieved a confident victory by liberating more than 70 villages and 8 strategic heights in a single day. Our victory at the military and political levels showcased the country's military prowess, defense capabilities, and diplomatic acumen in precise synchronicity, significantly bolstering its international reputation. Under the leadership of Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan became the first country in the world to resolve an ethno-territorial conflict, upholding the principle of justice.

The unique cooperation platforms initiated by President Ilham Aliyev played a crucial role in reconciling diverse interests in the region and creating new geopolitical realities that led to the liberation of our lands from occupation. Alongside military might, ideological, political, and diplomatic factors played essential roles in freeing our territories, which had been under occupation for nearly 30 years. During the Patriotic War, the country's leader effectively addressed biased questions from global media representatives in multiple languages, articulating our just positions and gaining political, ideological, and diplomatic advantages. In this context, the joint statement signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia on November 10 served as the official acknowledgment and political declaration of

the victory achieved on the battlefield. For Armenia, this document represents an acknowledgment of military defeat.

The provisions outlined in the 9-point joint statement signed by the three heads of state on November 10, 2020, clearly reflect Azerbaijan's demands. Leveraging its position of strength attained during the 44-day Patriotic War, Azerbaijan asserted its conditions and established entirely new realities in the conflict landscape. Consequently, the joint statement did not address the current or future status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The third and fourth paragraphs of the statement mandate the complete withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from Karabakh, the temporary deployment of a 1,960-strong Russian peacekeeping contingent along the contact line and the Lachin corridor in Karabakh, the return of Kalbajar, Aghdam, and Lachin to Azerbaijan, the evacuation of Armenians from these regions, and the repatriation of internally displaced persons and refugees to the Karabakh territory, with these processes being monitored by the peacekeeping contingent. Additionally, the establishment of a Turkish-Russian peacekeeping center is planned to oversee the ceasefire and enhance monitoring of compliance with the agreements, aimed at fostering lasting peace in the region. Thus, with the evacuation of Kalbajar, Aghdam, and Lachin, and the transfer of border regions to Azerbaijani army control, only the narrow 5 km Lachin corridor will effectively connect Armenia and Karabakh.

It is noteworthy that the peaceful return of Aghdam, Kalbajar, and Lachin, achieved without bloodshed or loss of life, stands as a testament to the determination and diplomatic prowess of the Commander-in-Chief, President Ilham Aliyev. This strategic maneuver effectively coerced the enemy into accepting peace through force, thereby ensuring that our military victory continues to underpin our strategic advantage at the political level.

Clause 7, which entails the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to the

territory of Karabakh and adjacent regions under the supervision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, extends beyond altering the demographic balance solely in favor of Azerbaijan. It also encompasses Khankendi and Khojaly, which are not explicitly mentioned in the agreement, thereby laying the groundwork for the complete restoration of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.

Furthermore, the inclusion of a provision in the joint statement regarding the establishment of a land transport connection between Nakhchivan and the western regions of Azerbaijan marks a significant event that will reshape the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape of

the region as a whole. Additionally, forging a direct land connection between Azerbaijan and the main part of Turkey will elevate the level of cooperation between the two nations to a new qualitative dimension.

Given the historical significance of the statement and the varied public reaction to certain aspects of it, the Center for Social Research conducted an opinion poll to gauge public sentiment towards the statement. The survey also encompassed a range of questions regarding the course and outcome of the war.

METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SURVEY

Selection of respondents

603 respondents, selected through an effective method, participated in the survey. The primary objective of the selection process was to ensure a proportional representation of respondents from each economic district. A landline phone number was chosen from each residential area, exceeding the required number of respondents by 10 times. Every third number within the overall set of phone numbers for the selected clusters was dialed. In cases of refusal, the third number on the list was contacted.

Scope of the study

The research was conducted among the urban, regional and rural population of Baku, Absheron and 7 economic regions (Ganja-Gazakh, Sheki-Zagatala, Lankaran, Guba-Khachmaz, Aran, Nagorno-Shirvan, Upper Karabakh).

Based on the sample size, the statistical error rate is 4%, and the confidence level is 95%.

Research method and survey method

A questionnaire survey was conducted within the framework of the quantitative methodology. Considering the constraints of the quarantine measures and the health of the participants, telephone interviews were conducted using the SurveyToGo program. The fieldwork took place from December 1 to December 4, 2020, with phone calls made between 10:00 and 21:00. On average, the duration of each survey was 12 minutes and 15 seconds.

Ethical principles

Anonymity was strictly maintained in all interviews. Respondents were assured that their responses would only be used in aggregate form. This assurance contributed to the high reliability of the data collected through the survey.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire comprises 26 questions, including 22 specific inquiries and 4 socio-demographic queries. These questions were designed to ascertain attitudes toward the statement signed by Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia on November 10, as well as the outcomes of the 44-day Patriotic War.

Instruction

Prior to commencing the survey, interviewers underwent thorough training conducted by Center staff. During this training, interviewers were equipped with questionnaires and provided with detailed instructions. Each question in the questionnaire was meticulously explained, and interviewers conducted test surveys to ensure their comprehension and proficiency.

Data processing and analysis


Following the survey's conclusion, the data collected from each questionnaire was directly entered into the database for analysis using SPSS - Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. In addition to conducting descriptive analysis, various correlations between variables were determined, and the Chi-Square (X^2) test was also applied.

Note: Percentages in charts may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS OF THE RESPONDENTS




Gender composition



- 1 Male 2 Female




Age



- 1 18-25 2 26-35 3 36-45
4 46-55 5 56-65 6 65+




Education level



- 1 High education 2 Vocational education
3 Complete secondary 4 General secondary education
5 I have no education




Employment



- 1 Employed in the public
2 Pensioner
3 Homework
4 Unemployed
5 Employed in the private sector
6 Householder
7 Individual labor activity
8 Student



Economic districts where the survey was conducted (in %)



1

The results of the Patriotic War in public opinion

- 1.1.** Expectations of respondents regarding the Patriotic War
- 1.2.** Reflection of expectations in the result
- 1.3.** Effects of the Patriotic War on the country

1.1. Expectations of respondents regarding the Patriotic War

Diagram 1.



Note: The total percentage of responses received differs from 100% because respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple options.


The primary expectation of society from the Patriotic War, which commenced on September 27, was the complete liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh and its seven adjacent regions from occupation (90.6%). In essence, only 6.0% of respondents anticipated the liberation of either the surrounding seven districts or Nagorno-Karabakh alone. Notably, almost one in three respondents (30.7%) believed the war would conclude sooner, while 7.8% believed it would extend longer. Equally noteworthy is that only 2.5% of respondents anticipated the arrival of international peacekeepers. This outcome indicates that the majority of the population does not anticipate the deployment of peacekeepers.

(29.2%) stems from the incomplete control of the Lachin Corridor, connecting Karabakh and Armenia, by Azerbaijan. Regarding employment sectors, 18.4% of respondents from the private sector expressed dissatisfaction with the war's outcome, while for retirees and the unemployed, these figures were 9.6% and 13.0%, respectively. Similarly, dissatisfaction varied across economic regions, with figures standing at 24.0% in Absheron, 19.0% in Shaki-Zagatala, and 10.0% in Lankaran, indicating regional disparities.

1.2. Reflection of expectations in the result

In general, the Patriotic War did not conclude as expected for approximately 12.0% of respondents (72 people). Two primary reasons stand out for this discrepancy - the failure to remove Armenians from all occupied lands (67.7%) and the deployment of Russian peacekeepers into the region (44.6%). Dissatisfaction among about one-third of the sample


Diagram 2.



Among the 88.4% of respondents who stated that the war ended as they expected, the mid-



Why do you think the war didn't end the way you expected?



- 1 Armenians should be removed from all occupied lands
- 2 Russian peacekeepers entered the region
- 3 The connection between Karabakh and Armenia through the Lachin Corridor should be under our full control
- 4 Sovereignty must be fully restored in the entire territory of Karabakh
- 5 Turkish peacekeepers should have the same status as Russian peacekeepers in the region
- 6 Other

Note: The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% as respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple options.

dle (36-45 years old) and older (56-65 years old) age groups predominate over other age groups. When examining the educational indicators of the respondents, those with complete secondary education (54.0%) were more likely to say that the Patriotic War ended as they expected compared to others. This indicator is almost twice as low among those with higher education compared to those with complete secondary education (28.0%).


In addition to the military and diplomatic gains of the Patriotic War, several significant consequences for society were also observed. The most notable positive impact, according to the population, was the further increase in trust in the Commander-in-Chief (90.0%) and the national army (84.0%). Half of the population (49.3%) believes that the Patriotic War replaced the "defeat syndrome" that arose in the 1990s with the feeling of a "victorious nation". Additionally, 27.0% of the respondents selected the option "There were no major issues in socio-economic security".

1.3. Effects of the Patriotic War on the country

Diagram 3.



What were the effects of the 44-day Patriotic War for our country?



- 1 Confidence in the Commander-in-Chief increased even more
- 2 It increased confidence in the army
- 3 It strengthened national unity
- 4 «Defeat syndrome» was replaced by the feeling of «victorious people».
- 5 There were no mass problems in socio-economic security
- 6 The price of consumer goods increased
- 7 Weakening of the economy was observed
- 8 Other

Note: The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% as respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple options.

2

Level of Awareness Regarding the Statement Signed on November 10 and Attitude Toward the Statement


- 2.1. Level of awareness of the peace agreement
- 2.2. Effectiveness and clarity of comments made on the joint statement
- 2.3. Relation to the joint statement
- 2.4. Pros and cons of the joint statement

2.1. Level of awareness of the peace agreement

81.0% of the respondents stated that they are aware of the statement signed by Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia on November 10, with 42.5% indicating they are “fully aware” and 38.5% stating they are “partially aware”. Conversely, 19.1% of the respondents reported having no information about the joint statement. In terms of regional analysis concerning the level of awareness, respondents from Baku, Absheron, and Aran regions showed a slightly higher proportion of those who were “partially informed” compared to those who claimed to be “fully informed”. More than 90.0% of individuals working in both the public and private sectors have some degree of information about the joint statement.

The option “I have no information” was more frequently selected by respondents with general secondary education (40.0%) and those with complete secondary education (26.8%). In terms of geographical distribution, regions such as Sheki-Zagatala (24.0%), Aran (23.4%), and Guba-Khachmaz (21.6%) had a relatively higher proportion of respondents who were unaware of the statement. Regarding employment status, individuals who reported not being informed about the statement were more prevalent among households (31.6%), the self-employed (27.8%), and the unemployed (25.6%).

Diagram 4.




2.2. Effectiveness and clarity of comments made on the joint statement

About 14.0% of respondents still have unclear points about the statement signed by Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia on November 10. Among those who mainly receive information from social networks, 20.0% reported having unclear points, while this figure is 12.8% among those who mainly rely on television for information.

For a portion of the population (14.0%), three main points remain unclear regarding the statement: the lack of a clear statement about the status of the three regions - Khan-kendi, Khojaly, and Khojavend (41.0%), the absence of mechanisms for regulating the coexistence of Azerbaijanis and Armenians (26.0%), and uncertainty about Russia’s future activities as peacekeepers (24.0%).


In terms of socio-demographics, differences were observed among educational groups. Specifically, 33.0% of respondents with no education and 25.0% of those with general secondary education expressed uncertainties about the statement signed on November 10, while the figure dropped to only 7.6% for those with vocational-specialized education.

Diagram 5.



Regarding the question “How useful are the media comments on the statement?” approximately 75.0% of the respondents indicated that clear explanations were provided. However, 15.4% stated that conflicting opinions were expressed, and 6.8% mentioned that no clear interpretation was given at all, which is a concerning issue. It’s plausible that one of the reasons for some respondents’ concern about the statement is precisely due to problems with interpretations provided by the media.

Diagram 6.




2.3. Relation to the joint statement

85.9% of the population expressed a positive attitude toward the joint statement signed by Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia to varying degrees (54.2% “completely positive”, 31.7% “mostly positive”). Compared to young people, older individuals are more likely to evaluate the statement positively. The indicator of those who expressed a negative attitude toward the joint statement, to some extent, is only 7.2%. Vocational/college graduates (90.2%) and university graduates (89.1%) rated the statement favorably compared to other groups (45,870 (8), $p < 0.01$). Regionally, individuals who view the statement positively are fewer in Baku (45.3%) and Absheron (31.5%) than in other areas. Similarly, in Absheron, the number of those who evaluated the statement negatively (15.0%) was almost twice as high as in most areas (69,942 (32), $p < 0.01$).

A significant finding is the statistically significant correlation between the level of awareness of the statement signed by Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia on November 10 and the attitude toward the statement (44.160 (8), $p < 0.01$). Thus, the higher the level of

Diagram 7.



awareness, the more likely the attitude toward the statement will be positive. For example, 92.0% of respondents who stated they were fully aware of the statement viewed it favorably, while the corresponding figure was about 20.0% lower for those who had no information. This underscores the necessity to educate the public about the statement through the people and institutions they trust.

2.4. Pros and cons of the joint statement

To gauge the level of real awareness among respondents about the statement, they were asked to indicate the items they liked or disliked in the statement. Only 56.4% of the respondents (340 people) expressed their opinion about the items they liked or disliked in the joint statement. The fact that 43.6% of the respondents could not express any opinion about it shows that they are not fully aware of the statement. In the previous question about awareness, 38.5% said that they were partially aware, and about 20.0% said that they had no information at all. This indicates that about two-thirds of the population is actually aware of the statement.

56.6% of the respondents who stated that there are still unclear points about the statement noted the negative aspects of the statement. Conversely, 23.5% of the respondents who stated that all points are clear mentioned the negative aspects.

40.6% of the respondents chose the 6th point (44.9%) regarding the withdrawal of Armenia's troops from Aghdam, Kalbajar, and Lachin regions, and the 9th point, which pro-

vides for the restoration of all economic and transport links in the region and the liberation of Nakhchivan from the blockade, as the two most liked points of the joint statement. This reflects the essence of the historical victory achieved by Azerbaijan, which is measured by military successes as well as contributions to the foundation of the state.

There are more respondents from Guba-Khachmaz (80.0%) and Absheron (60.0%) who positively evaluated item 6. It is interesting that only 11.8% of the respondents from Upper Karabakh evaluated the mentioned item positively. Point 9 was chosen more by respondents from Absheron (53.3%) and Ganja-Gazakh (45.7%).

28.0% of respondents mentioned the 3rd point (40.8%) regarding the deployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent along the contact line in Karabakh and the Lachin corridor as the two points they disliked the most, and the 4th point regarding the deployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in parallel with the withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces (43.2%) noted.

As a result of the analysis of the opinions on the 3rd and 4th points of the statement, it can be concluded that the mentioned points are the complete withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from Karabakh, as well as

the peaceful withdrawal of Armenians from Kalbajar, Aghdam, and Lachin by means of peacekeeping forces and our internally displaced persons and refugees to the territory of Karabakh. Although it envisages their return, the absence of Turkish peacekeepers in the military contingent indicates concerns about returning to the past traditional line regarding territorial claims against Azerbaijan.

38.6% of men and 43.2% of women evaluated item 3 negatively. A similar result can be applied to item 4 (men 40.9%, women 45.7%). Respondents from Aran and Absheron evaluated item 3 more negatively; these indicators are 66.7% and 62.5%, respectively. 34.0% of those working in the public sector and 73.3% of those working in the private sector evaluated this item negatively, which shows the difference between sectors.

Negative indicators on point 4 were recorded more among respondents from Ganja-Gazakh (63.0%) and Absheron (56.3%). For the population of Baku, this figure is equal to 54.2%. In this direction, the lowest indicator was recorded among the residents of Upper Karabakh and Lankaran; the indicators for both economic regions are the same -11.1%. The general secondary (66.7%) and higher educated (46.5%) evaluated item 4 more negatively than other groups.

3

Socio-political expression of the joint statement

- 3.1.** The results of the peace agreement in public opinion
- 3.2.** Effects of the Nakhchivan corridor on the socio-economic development of Azerbaijan


3.1. The results of the peace agreement in public opinion

A considerable number of respondents (60.7%) believe that the joint statement signed by Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia highlights the diplomatic skills of the President of Azerbaijan. In comparison, in a previous survey conducted before the Patriotic War, 93.1% of respondents believed that only the country's leadership could resolve the Karabakh issue through military means. This suggests that public expectations have now aligned with the current situation.

Respondents from Upper Karabakh and Sheki-Zagatala, particularly, noted the diplomatic skills of the President. More than half of the population (51.6%) felt that the Commander-in-Chief protects the people's interests through the document. Specifically, 68.3% of respondents from the southern zone (Lenkoran) and 55.2% from Upper Karabakh held this view. Additionally, 65.0% of those with general secondary education and 48.0% with vocational-specialized education believed the statement reflects the Supreme Commander's commitment to safeguarding people's interests.

Moreover, 16.9% of respondents mentioned that the peace agreement signifies the army's role in the international arena. There were differences across regions in this opinion, with 42.1% of Absheron residents sharing this view compared to only 3.2% in Lankaran. This aspect reflects Azerbaijan's strategic military collaboration with various countries, leading to recent victories and boosting confidence in resolving the issue.

Diagram 8.



Note: The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% as respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple options.

3.2. Possible effects of the Nakhchivan corridor on the socio-economic development of Azerbaijan

69.0% of the population believes that the connection with Nakhchivan will lead to reduced travel and cargo transportation costs between Azerbaijan and Turkey, with a corresponding increase in traffic and cargo turnover (63.7%). As education levels rise, so does the expectation of increased traffic and cargo circulation between Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The anticipation of decreased transportation and freight prices between Azerbaijan and Turkey is notably higher (over 80.0%) among residents of Aran, Upper Karabakh, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

According to 58.5% of respondents, the mutual access opportunities of Turkey and Russia through Nakhchivan will positively impact the socio-economic development of the region. Expectations in this regard also increase with higher levels of education.

Additionally, 56.2% of respondents believe that the opening of a direct transport corridor between Nakhchivan and our western regions will accelerate the integration of the Turkic world. About half of the population (44.6%) share the opinion that this corridor will foster the establishment of a robust system of economic and political relations alongside trade circulation.

These results raise hopes for the anticipated contribution to the economic development of the autonomous republic. With the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, which has been a hindrance to the economic stability of Central Asian countries, and Turkey's access to the region, new economic development prospects are envisioned for our liberated regions. These expectations strengthen with higher levels of education.

Diagram 9.



Note: The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% as respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple options.

4

Ensuring peace in the region

- 4.1. The peacekeeping factor in the issue of the security of Karabakh
- 4.2. Expectations from the arrival of Russian peacekeepers in the region
- 4.3. Joint participation of Turkish and Russian peacekeepers in the region

4.1. The peacekeeping factor in the issue of the security of Karabakh

More than half of the population (54.7%) believes that peace in the region can be ensured with the joint participation of both Turkish and Russian peacekeepers.

Respondents from Lankaran and Nagorno-Shirvan share the same conclusion, at 61.9%. This figure stands at 58.0% for Baku and Upper Karabakh. Higher education and vocational/college graduates hold this opinion more than other groups – 65.7% and 56.5%, respectively.

29.0% of the respondents see only Turkish peacekeepers as guarantors of peace in the region. It is worth noting that in the previous analytical report by STM titled “Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict before and after the Homeland War,” a positive answer was given by 94.5% of the respondents to the question, “Do you believe that the Turkish army will provide direct military support to Azerbaijan in the event of war?” This indicates that in post-November 10 polls, respondents expressed rational positions rather than mere wishes and dreams in light of the actual situation.

Diagram 11.



That is, the expectation in public opinion is that regional and international powers would not obstruct the armed forces of a strategic ally and brotherly country from carrying out its peacekeeping mission independently. Only 4.5% of respondents indicated that this mission would be provided by international peacekeepers. This sentiment is more prevalent among those with general secondary and complete secondary education, at 45.0% and 31.6%, respectively. Only 1.0% believe that only Russian peacekeepers will ensure peace in the region.

4.2. Expectations from the arrival of Russian peacekeepers in the region

35.5% of respondents believe that the arrival of Russian peacekeepers in the region will yield positive results. Conversely, 44.6% hold the opposite view. Interestingly, 19.9% of respondents found it challenging to answer this question. Among respondents aged over 65, 76.0% evaluated this issue positively compared to young people. Absheron (42.1%) and Aran (51.8%) recorded the lowest rates of positive opinions regarding the arrival of Russian peacekeepers compared to other regions. Respondents from Baku and Upper Karabakh equally share the opposing position at 20.7%. Furthermore, those working in the private sector (30.2%) and those under individual employment contracts (30.6%) were more inclined towards a negative stance compared to other occupational groups. It is worth noting that the survey was conducted shortly after the tripartite declaration, indicating a rapid shift in the population's stance. However, the results are influenced by historical, geopolitical, informational, and emotional factors rather than purely military-political ones.

Diagram 11.





Diagram 12.



Note: The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% as respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple options.

66.8% of those who view the arrival of Russian peacekeepers positively believe it will prevent Armenian provocations against Azerbaijanis. Specifically, 83.3% of high school graduates and 70.0% of vocational/college graduates share this belief.

Regarding the fulfillment of the terms of the signed agreement, 43.2% of respondents expressed confidence. Men (47.6%) hold this opinion more than women (38.6%). This sen-

timent is strongest among respondents from Absheron (81.3%) but considerably lower in Upper Karabakh (28.6%). 40.3% of respondents believe that sustainable and long-term peace will be achieved in the region. Men (45.0%) are more likely to hold this view compared to women (35.5%). The majority of respondents from Guba-Khachmaz (61.5%) share this opinion, while it is least prevalent in Upper Karabakh (19.1%).

Diagram 13.



Note: The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% as respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple options.

Another positive outcome identified by 18.2% of respondents is the potential for future dialogue, mutual recognition, and sustainable peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

On the flip side, 84.7% of those concerned about the arrival of Russian peacekeepers fear that they will prioritize Armenian interests. This concern is shared by 90.0% of women and 79.2% of men across educational levels, economic regions, and occupational groups.

The possibility of a military base being established in Karabakh with the arrival of Russian peacekeepers is a concern for 42.9% of respondents. Notably, this concern was not voiced by anyone from Upper Karabakh or Lankaran. General secondary education and vocational/college graduates share this concern equally at 50.0%.

Furthermore, 36.7% of respondents believe that Karabakh will be recognized as a region under Russian control.

Negative expectations include fears that the arrival of Russian peacekeepers may strengthen separatist tendencies (31.6%) and prolong the conflict settlement process (30.6%). These concerns are more prevalent among the population of Aran, with 71.4% and 66.7% expressing these worries, respectively.

4.3. Joint participation of Turkish and Russian peacekeepers in the region


57.0% of the population believes that the presence of Turkish peacekeepers alongside Russian peacekeepers will prevent the illegal (anti-constitutional) activities of Armenians in the region. This positive expectation is particularly strong in Nagorno-Shirvan (90.5%) and Absheron (89.5%) compared to other regions.

49.6% of respondents have faith that the terms of the signed agreement will be honored. Similarly, 47.3% see the presence of the Turkish military contingent in the peacekeeping force as a guarantee of stable and long-term peace in the region. Furthermore, 33.8% believe it will strengthen Azerbaijan's diplomatic position and contribute to the restoration of its territorial integrity. This opinion is more prevalent among men (40.4%) than women (27.2%). Nagorno-Karabakh residents largely share this sentiment, with 90.5% expressing similar views.

Diagram 14.



What do you think will be the results of the joint mission of Turkish peacekeepers with Russian peacekeepers in the region?



- 1 Illegal activities of Armenians will be prevented
- 2 Fulfillment of the terms of the signed agreement will be ensured
- 3 Will ensure sustainable and long-term peace in the region
- 4 Will strengthen the position and restoration of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity at the diplomatic level
- 5 Will strengthen the military-political alliance between Russia and Turkey
- 6 Will minimize Armenia's false historical claims against Azerbaijan and Turkey
- 7 The presence of the Turkish military contingent in the region will minimize the involvement of the West and the United States in the region
- 8 Other
- 9 DTA

Note: The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% as respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple options.

5 Attitude towards the coexistence of Azerbaijanis and Armenians and the possibility of renewed conflict

5.1. Attitude towards coexistence

5.2. Anticipation of war


5.1. Attitude towards coexistence

A significant portion of the population (66.2%) believes that coexistence between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in the administrative territories of Karabakh will never be possible, while 19.4% believe it might be achievable after a few years. Only 4.8% of respondents think such coexistence could happen in the near future.

Women (74.4%) are more inclined than men (58.0%) to believe that coexistence between Azerbaijanis and Armenians will never be possible. Conversely, more men (25.5%) than women (13.3%) believe that cohabitation might be possible after a few years. Young people are more likely than other age groups to express skepticism about the possibility of living together with Armenians.

More than 80.0% of the population in Sheki-Zagatala and Upper Karabakh express opposition to coexistence. Similarly, a significant portion of Absheron residents (73.7%) share the same opinion. The belief that cohabitation is impossible is prevalent among those with general secondary education (75.0%), vocational-specialization/college graduates (71.7%), those with full secondary education (69.0%), and those with higher education (57.7%).

Diagram 15.




Please note that in the “Great Return to Karabakh” survey conducted by the Center for Social Research on October 9-13, 2020, 72.0% of IDP respondents believed that coexistence with the Armenian population in Karabakh, along with other ethnic minorities, was impossible. Only 14.0% believed that such coexistence might be possible, but only after a long time. In the same survey, 90.3% of respondents stated that they personally would not live with Armenians in those lands in the future, while about 8.0% said they could consider it.

5.2. Anticipation of war

Although the majority of society (66.1%) believes that the military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan will not reignite, 28.6% of respondents hold the opposite view, highlighting the skepticism towards the November 10 statement to some extent. In other words, this result suggests that 28.6% of respondents do not believe the conflict will fully cease. Among young people, there is a predominant belief that the military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan will reignite compared to other age groups. Specifically, 37.3% of young respondents hold this view. Regarding employment status, 40.0% of those working in the public sector believe that a military conflict could resume, the highest among all groups. Additionally, 36.0% of those with higher education and 20.0% of those with general secondary education share this opinion.

Diagram 16.



6 Information policy and information sources during the Patriotic War


6.1. Evaluation of information policy during the Patriotic War

6.2. Information sources during the Patriotic War

6.1. Evaluation of information policy during the Patriotic War

During the Patriotic War, alongside military operations, the information war was waged vigorously. It is in this regard that the public evaluation of the information policy becomes crucial. A significant portion of the population believes that the President's interviews with foreign media played a decisive role in our victory in the information war (80.0%). Besides the foreign audience, the President's regular communication with the people was the second most positively regarded aspect of the information policy (67.3%). Only 6.8% of respondents hold the opinion that we cannot effectively convey Azerbaijani truths to the world and prevent Armenian provocations.


Diagram 17.



6.2. Information sources during the Patriotic War

Against the backdrop of rapid developments, the information acquisition behavior of the population emerges as one of the critical factors. Just as before the war, during the 44-day conflict, television remained the primary source of information for the population (90.4%). Across all age groups, respondents primarily relied on television for information during this period. Among younger respondents, this figure stood at 70.6%, while for respondents in the older age group (56+ years), it was 97.0%. Following television, other sources of information included the President's social media accounts (21.0%), conversations with acquaintances (12.3%), and social media platforms (12.0%).


Diagram 18.



Note: The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% as respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple options.

Out of the 90.4% of respondents who indicated television as their source of information, 62.6% mentioned AZTV, 60.2% ATV, 59.8% Khazar TV, and 42.2% Real TV as their primary sources during the war. It's important to note that these results are specific to the war-time period and may not reflect the overall ratings of TV channels. The viewership numbers and ratings of television channels can vary across different periods, months, and years.


Diagram 19.



Note: The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% as respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple options.

Among social networks, Instagram (52.4%) and Facebook (42.9%) are the platforms that most users rely on for information. Telegram and Twitter, which have gained popularity in recent years, serve as one of the main sources of information for 19.0% of respondents.


Diagram 20.



Note: The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% as respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple options.

During the Patriotic War, the majority of respondents (79.2%) who obtained information from the President's social network accounts followed the President's Twitter account. 13.9% of respondents followed the President's activities on Instagram, and 11.1% on Facebook.

Diagram 21.




Note: The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% as respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple options.

Only 4.2% of the population used Internet TV as the main source of information during the 44-day war, with Kanal 13 (44.0%), Meydan TV (28.0%), and Baku TV (20.0%) being the most prominent channels. The low viewership figures for Internet TV and websites can be attributed to the restrictions imposed on Internet resources due to information security concerns.

Analyzing the differences by economic regions reveals that the highest TV viewership rates were observed in Guba-Khachmaz (100%), Aran (98.0%), and Upper Karabakh (97.0%), while Absheron exhibited the lowest rate in this regard (68.0%). However, Absheron stands out for its high number of social network users (48.0%). In contrast, this indicator was 35.0% in Baku, 19.0% in Ganja-Gazakh, and 17.0% in Guba-Khachmaz.

A concerning aspect is the limited use of websites and social network pages of relevant institutions for information. Another study conducted by STM on COVID-19 re-

Diagram 22.



Note: The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% as respondents were given the opportunity to select multiple options.

vealed that the reference to official institutions' information resources in Azerbaijan is not widespread among the population. This underscores the need for state institutions to be more proactive in promoting their websites and social network pages, such as those of the Ministry of Defense, through extensive outreach efforts among the population.

CONCLUSION

❖ The primary expectation of the population during the 44-day Second Karabakh War was the complete liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh and its seven adjacent regions from occupation, a goal that was achieved by the war's end. The Patriotic War concluded in alignment with the expectations of almost the entire population.

❖ Another significant difference between the Second Karabakh War and the First Karabakh War was the absence of significant food shortages, lack of medical and hygiene supplies, and price increases across the country during the 44-day conflict, despite the concurrent COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the conflict at the frontlines, civilians in other regions carried on with their daily lives uninterrupted. The prevailing opinion among the population is that the war did not have any negative socio-economic effects on our country. The most common sentiment among the people is that the outcomes of the Patriotic War have bolstered confidence in the Commander-in-Chief and the armed forces.

❖ Public awareness of the joint statement signed on November 10 is not very high. A certain portion of the population still has unclear points about the statement. People's awareness of the statement also influences their attitudes. Thus, individuals with little or no information about the statement tend to have a more negative attitude toward the joint statement.

❖ Overall, the vast majority of the population positively evaluates the joint statement signed by Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia. Those who appreciate the points of the joint statement outnumber those who do not. The two most favored clauses of the joint statement entail the withdrawal of Armenia's troops from Aghdam, Kalbajar, and Lachin regions, as well as the restoration of all economic and transport links in the region, including the liberation of Nakhchivan from the blockade.

❖ The two points that respondents disliked the most were the 3rd point, which envisages the deployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent along the contact line and the La-

chin corridor in Karabakh, and the 4th point, which refers to the deployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in parallel with the withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces. This underscores the importance of providing clear and comprehensive information to the population about the points of the statement.

❖ According to the viewpoint of a substantial portion of the respondents, the joint statement signed by Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia is perceived as a demonstration of the diplomatic acumen of the President of Azerbaijan, the Commander-in-Chief, and his commitment to safeguarding the interests of the people. There is a considerable expectation among the population regarding the positive ramifications of restoring transportation links with Nakhchivan for the social, political, and economic development of our country.

❖ It should be noted that the views of the President and most of the people coincide with the deployment of peacekeepers in the region. More than half of the population thinks that peace in the region can be ensured with the participation of both Russian and Turkish peacekeepers.

❖ Respondents anticipate positive outcomes from the arrival of Russian peacekeepers because they believe that Russian peacekeepers can mitigate provocations against Azerbaijanis by Armenians. Additionally, they expect Armenia to reconcile with Russia owing to its reliance on the latter, and they perceive Russia as being invested in fostering peace in the region. However, concerns among those who believe that the arrival of Russian peacekeepers will yield negative consequences mainly revolve around the potential for these peacekeepers to prioritize Armenian interests and for Russia to establish a military base in Karabakh.

❖ A majority of the population believes that the joint mission of Turkish and Russian peacekeepers in the region will be instrumental in preventing the illegal (unconstitutional) activities of Armenians. Furthermore, there is a widespread belief that the fulfillment of the terms of the signed agreement will be

ensured through the collaborative efforts of Turkish peacekeepers alongside Russian peacekeepers.

❖ Confidence in the coexistence of Azerbaijanis and Armenians in the administrative territories of Nagorno-Karabakh is significantly low among the population. This lack of trust stems from the actions of Armenians against Azerbaijanis. Despite the peaceful coexistence of over 30,000 Armenians in various areas of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijanis harbor doubts about this cohabitation due to past actions by Armenians. Young people, in particular, express greater skepticism about the possibility of living together with Armenians compared to respondents from other age groups.

❖ Suspicion of Armenians and the Armenian state, coupled with the anticipation of negative actions from them, has heightened the possibility of the resumption of the military conflict among a certain segment of the population. This sentiment is particularly prevalent among young people.

❖ The information policy implemented during the 44-day Patriotic War is generally positively assessed by the population, influenced by several factors. Primarily, the President's regular interviews with various foreign media outlets and his direct communication with the public about the ongoing events played a significant role. Additionally, foreign media representatives visiting the country and reporting directly from the scene, continuous coverage of the war by Turkish channels, and regular updates provided by local TV channels also contributed to effective information dissemination and live reporting.

❖ As in previous times, television remained the primary source of information for the population during the 44-day war. However, there was an even greater increase in the number of people relying on television during this period compared to others. This can be attributed to the live broadcasts of the President's addresses to the nation and the nationwide restrictions on internet access implemented during the war.

❖ Public opinion regarding the joint state-

ment signed by Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia on November 10, 2020, marking the end of the 44-day-long Second Karabakh War, suggests that while perceived as a document safeguarding the interests of Azerbaijan, concerns persist regarding both the statement itself and the current and future state of the conflict.

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